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Abstract: Information security within healthcare is paramount and telemedicine applications present unique 
security challenges. Technology is giving rise to new and advanced telemedicine applications and 
understanding the security threats to these applications is needed to ensure, among other things, the privacy 
of patient information. This paper presents a high level analysis of a telemedicine application in order to 
better understand the security threats to this unique and vulnerable environment. This risk analysis is 
performed using the concept of threat tables. This case study focuses on the capture and representation of 
salient security threats in telemedicine. To analyze the security threats to an application, we present a threat 
modeling framework utilizing a table driven approach.  Our analysis reveals that even in a highly controlled 
environment with static locations, the security risks posed by telemedicine applications are significant, and 
that using a threat table approach provides an easy-to-use and effective method for managing these threats.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Advances in healthcare technology, like telemedicine, will likely improve quality of care, reduce cost, and advance 
medicine in general. However, with technological advances comes increased information security and privacy risks. 
The digitization of health records, data transmission over public networks, and an assortment of client side devices 
increases the opportunity for privacy invasion and medical identity theft, costing patients, providers, and payers. As 
the very nature of telemedicine is vulnerable to security breaches, the security of personal health information in 
telemedicine applications is paramount. 
This work-in-progress study seeks to analyze information security threats in telemedicine applications using a 
threat table model developed by the authors. Drawing on various techniques from the research literature, we 
construct a threat table that lists security vulnerabilities and potential remedies for various threats to a system or 
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software application. We feel that this threat table approach to modeling will prove a valuable addition to risk 
analysis, system analysis, or audit of any information system. To examine its usefulness, we analyzed a telemedicine 
application used at a Midwestern college of medicine (CoM) to provide remote clinical care for hepatitis-C and HIV 
patients at state penitentiaries. The CoM system has one provider location serving 22 remote locations within the 
state.   
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
Telemedicine 
 
Telemedicine is a technology-based method to provide clinical healthcare at a distance. It is considered a sub-
category of telehealth, which is, generally, the remote delivery of health related services. Technological advances 
and the digitization of data have given rise to numerous telehealth applications. Such is the usefulness of modern 
telehealth that the federal government created the Office for the Advancement of Telehealth, part of the Office of 
Rural Health Policy within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, to promote the use of telehealth 
technologies for health care delivery, education, and health information services.  
 
Health Information Security 
 
With forthcoming legislation that became HIPAA, one of the first definitive works on threats to information in 
healthcare came in response to a request in October 1995 from the U.S. National Library of Medicine (NLM) by the 
Computer Science and Telecommunications Board who produced the report, For the Record: Protecting Electronic 
Health Information (National Research Council, 1997). Subsequently, NLM awarded projects that included the 
assessment of various approaches to ensuring the confidentiality of health data transmitted via electronic networks 
(National Library of Medicine, 2012).  
A core requirement of telemedicine system analysis and development should include analysis of risk to both 
information security and patient privacy. Advanced risk analysis methods have long been used within many fields, 
such as insurance, military, finance, aviation, and others. However, only in recent years did the software industry 
finally develop workable frameworks to address security. This is exemplified by the development of the Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) in 2001 and Microsoft’s development of the Security Development 
Lifecycle (SDL) in 2004. Additionally, other risk methods have also been applied to information systems. Such 
methods include CRAMM (CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method; Central Computing and 
Telecommunications Agency of the U.K. government), LAVA (Los Alamos Vulnerability Assessment), OCTAVE 
(Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) developed at Carnegie Mellon, and others.   
Threat modeling is often done in conjunction with risk analysis. When done so, it provides a deeper 
quantification of risk. Indeed, this approach is seen within Microsoft’s SDL.  Threat modeling of information 
systems or computer software is most often used for identification of vulnerabilities at entry points to a system, 
application, or their components. A threat model developed during the design phase can be used for verification 
during the test phase. A threat model may also be used to analyze existing systems and software to identify 
vulnerabilities. 
Frameworks for information security have been proposed for decades. When information security professionals 
and researchers realized that the classic triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability was inadequate to describe 
what security practitioners think about, they began proposing more extensive frameworks. Many have attempted to 
overcome the dominant technologist view of information security by focusing more holistically on security, 
including information assets, potential sources of loss, types of loss, controls to avoid loss, remediation selection 
methods, and the overall objectives in protecting information. For example, one approach included that of dividing 
information security into a technological component addressing logical aspects and one addressing physical aspects 
(Eloff, Labuschagne, and Badenhorst, 1993).  Their concepts include: risk identification, risk analysis, risk 
assessment, risk resolution, and risk monitoring. More recently, the six security elements of availability, utility, 
integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and possession have been proposed by Parker (2002) and used in his Threats, 
Assets, and Vulnerabilities Model. It is from the development of such frameworks that risk analysis methods such as 
CRAMM, LAVA, and OCTAVE arose, intending to encompass the calculation of risk in both the technical and 
physical aspects of risk analysis.   
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In contrast, OWASP and SDL focuses less on calculating risk and more on the identification of potential threats 
during the design and development of software. In such an environment, assigning risk to defined threats is only 
useful as far as prioritizing work, but not necessarily part of a calculus to determining remediation. Given the adage 
that information security is only as good as the weakest link in a system, the goal of system and software design is to 
identify all potential vulnerabilities and provide countermeasures to remove or mitigate risk.   
The literature also contains numerous studies on formal approaches to threat modeling. These protocols typically 
employ graph-based state modeling. Some rely on UML (Kong, Xu, and Zeng, 2010; Lund, Hogganvik, Seehusen, 
and Stolen, 2003), and others on Petri Net notation (Mirembe and Muyeba, 2008; Xu and Nygard, 2005; Youn, 
Park, and Lee, 2011).  Microsoft, on the other hand, developed the SDL framework utilizing data flow diagrams to 
identify asset entry points necessary for an attack based on their STRIDE model (Hernan, 2006). STRIDE is an 
acronym for the six threat categories of Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of 
service, and Elevation of privilege.  
 
Related Work 
 
A systematic study that identified 58 published articles that in some manner concerned security in telemedicine 
(Garg and Brewer, 2011) reflects the scarcity of studies in this area. However, of these 58 articles, few mentioned 
formal standards for security. In the literature of telemedicine system development there is research that develops a 
secure videoconferencing system for use in diagnosis and treatment (Tulu, Chatterjee, Abhichandani, and Li, 2003), 
secure texting in healthcare (Bones, Hasvold, Henriksen, Strandenoes, 2007), a handheld device for diagnosis and 
treatment of soldiers in the field (Morris, Pajak, Havlik, Kenyon, and Calcagni, 2006), a Web-based system for 
managing diabetic patients at home (Bellazi, Montaini, Riva, and Stefanelli, 2001), remote sensors that monitor 
patient health (Chowhurry 2012; Mirembe 2006; Xiao, Shen, Sun, and Cai, 2006), and applications akin to 
enterprise systems (Chen, Yu, and Feng, 2000; Liu, Lu, Hong, and Wang, 2008; Maji, Mukhoty, Majumdar, 
Mukhopadhyay, Sural, Paul, and Majumdar, 2008). Of these articles, only Maji et al. and Bones et al. devoted 
significant attention to threat models. Whereas, Bones et al. concentrated on demonstrating a risk assessment of 
approximately thirty potential threats synthesized from an ad-hoc brainstorming session utilizing the OCTAVE 
method, Maji et al. used OWASP and other resources to address fourteen specific threats most commonly 
experienced by Web applications. As such, we see that threat modeling in telemedicine has received scant attention.  
 
 
A THREAT TABLE METHOD 
 
Our approach is based on the work of Swiderski and Snyder (2004) and consists of five aspects: (1) Identification of 
the points at which an attack could occur, (2) identifying the potential vulnerabilities using STRIDE, (3) listing the 
specific attack types for the given vulnerabilities, (4) providing proposed countermeasures and, (5) classifying the 
goal of the countermeasure as either Prevention, Detection, Mitigation, or Elimination. Our contribution is the 
development of a meaningful and easy-to-use tool absent the need for learning a formal method or needing an 
automated tool. This table based approach captures concise information needed for threat identification and 
classification, and countermeasure proposal and classification. Stored electronically in a spreadsheet or relational 
database, the information is easily segmented, sorted, or reported in a manner conducive to the task at hand. The 
simplicity of the method allows those not versed in formal threat modeling, like subject matter experts, to participate 
in the process of threat management.  
We begin with a simple listing of the conceptual tasks that a system is envisioned to perform. This listing, which 
can be readily achieved using a common spreadsheet, is essentially free-form, using vocabulary and terminology 
that is familiar to the domain for which the system is to be used. The list of primary tasks is then decomposed into 
component tasks until all tasks are described. For each task, potential vulnerabilities are surmised and possible 
countermeasures proposed. Using this simple, straightforward approach, we believe that a threat table can capture all 
necessary information for threat modeling while arming software developers and their managers with sufficient 
guidance to address security breaches to the extent possible. We note that data flow diagrams could be utilized as the 
starting point of constructing a threat table since they can be used to visually identify entry points into a system or 
application. However, our model does not require their use.   
Specifically, our threat table is composed of five columns. The first column contains task information with each 
task described generally and its component tasks listed underneath. This process is completed when the component 
tasks cannot logically be reduced any further. These conceptual and concrete tasks comprise the rows of the threat 
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table with conceptual tasks serving as row headings. The remaining four columns are Vulnerability, Attack 
description, Countermeasure, and Goal of countermeasure. Vulnerability is noted used the STRIDE nomenclature 
described above. Attack description and Countermeasure are nominally described though a previously defined 
taxonomy could be used. The Goal of the countermeasure is noted as Prevention, Detection, Mitigation, or 
Elimination (P, D, M, or E). Notating the goal of a countermeasure is useful to later risk analysis efforts. 
Once the conceptual tasks have been decomposed, each component task is analyzed for vulnerabilities in 
accordance with the STRIDE model. For each category of STRIDE vulnerability, potential attacks against the task 
are considered. Each potential attack, along with the STRIDE classification, is then listed on a separate row. For 
each attack listed, countermeasures are then listed in order of preference, one per row, followed by the 
countermeasure goal. Thus, a task may be followed by several attack descriptions, each on a separate row. Each 
attack may be addressed by multiple countermeasures, again with each described on a separate row.   
Although the names of the goals have obvious associations, the intent of each is specific and not always 
apparent. Prevention refers to the idea that changes can be made in the system that prevent the possibility of a 
particular threat from ever occurring. For example, an interface to a system could be browser-based and use SQL 
statements to retrieve and store data in a database. If the code executing the SQL is not written well, an SQL 
injection attack is possible. By rewriting the code carefully, such as by using prepared statements, this type of attack 
could be entirely prevented. Of course, attacks used against certificates would be possible and would have to be 
addressed by other means. Detection comes into play when it is necessary for the remediation of a threat by the 
system, user, or some administrator. Mitigation refers only to reducing the likelihood or impact of the attack, and 
Elimination characterizes complete removal of the threat.   
The threat table approach is arguably simpler than formal models. It is also equally capable of modeling multiple 
path threats due to its hierarchical nature. Each task is denoted as a starting point in the threat table, and multiple 
threats may be listed as being applicable to the task. As such, the threat table forms a tree but without the graphical 
interface. For example, an attacker might wish to obtain sensitive information about a particular patient. If a task of 
“View sensitive information” were listed in the table, one threat might be “Spoof identity” while another might be 
“Unattended screen.” Thus, the table can depict multiple threat paths to the same task. Alternatively, the table 
approach also permits one to list the paths separately. Hence, one task could be listed as "Logging In" and the 
spoofing threat identified as a potential attack on that task, while "View sensitive information" is listed as a separate 
task and the "unattended screen" attack listed as its potential threat. Thus, the tabular nature of our approach 
provides functionality that is equivalent to paths provided by formal modeling approaches.   
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Architecture of System 
 
The CoM began providing remote clinical services to 22 state penitentiary locations for Hepatitis C and HIV clinical 
care in July 2010. This application of telemedicine serves remote and static locations using a system from Polycom 
to provide encrypted transmission of audio, video, and clinical instrumentation between the penitentiaries and CoM 
facility.  
There are two examination rooms at the CoM facility designed and equipped specifically for using the Polycom 
system.  A room contains a large high-definition screen, a remote controlled high-definition room camera mounted 
on top of the screen, microphones, speakers, controls for the remote (penitentiary) examination room camera, audio 
equalization for the stethoscope, and a PC providing access into CoM’s electronic medical record (EMR) system and 
a third-party laboratory. A PC-based application for connecting into the Polycom system is typically used by a 
caseworker and pharmacist from their respective office. A high level schematic is shown in figure 1.  
When a session is initiated, the patient is accompanied by a nurse in the examination room at the prison facility. 
A caseworker, physician, and pharmacist are present at the CoM facility for each session. Any medical data needed 
from the prison are either faxed, held up to the camera to be viewed, or communicated by phone. There is no 
electronic interoperability between the prison and CoM EMR systems. The physician at CoM manually creates and 
updates an EMR record for each patient. The examination begins with the caseworker validating the identity of the 
patient visually and with the on-site nurse. A high-definition camera sits above the monitor at each location and is 
remotely controlled by the viewers. A small hand-held, high-definition camera is used by the nurse to provide close 
up dermatological examination of the patient. An electronic stethoscope and otoscope that plug into the Polycom 
system provide remote instrumentation. The physician listens to the stethoscope using headphones that are tuned 
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with audio equalization for optimum auscultation. Finally, the otoscope provides remote visual examination into the 
ears, nose, and throat. 
If labs are needed, the nurse collects the appropriate sample(s) and sends to a third-party lab.  Using a Citrix 
application on his PC, the physician has remote login privilege in order to view lab results. As with the prison EMR, 
there is no interoperable system connection between CoM and the third-party lab. If medication is prescribed, the 
pharmacist participating in the session, typically from their office, orders the medication using a CoM Hospital 
system. The medication is packaged from a central location and shipped overnight to the prison. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. College of Medicine to Penitentiary telemedicine system 
 
Results 
 
This application of telemedicine consists of teleconferencing and digitized instrumentation. The environment is 
static and highly controlled, all but alleviating location privacy issues that can be problematic with telemedicine. 
With the Polycom system encrypting data end-to-end, any risk to information security during transmission is 
essentially eliminated. Furthermore, with equipment located in secure facilities and configured to use a fixed 
network, physical risk is minimized. Although the caseworker and pharmacist may be located in separate rooms 
from the physician, their data connections are on the internal CoM network and data is encrypted to their local 
computer. In general, the security risks to the CoM system are not as much technical as they are social.  
Despite the highly controlled environment for this telemedicine application, the risk for identity theft, as well as 
fraud, exists. The exact procedures used during a session were not disclosed and we were prohibited from viewing a 
session as it would be a violation of the patient’s rights. However, without proper checks and balances several social 
born threats are possible. For instance, a patient and a nurse at a prison facility could collude to falsify the patient’s 
medical condition in order to obtain medications, such as narcotics, that could then be sold to other prisoners or on 
the black market. Such a scheme can work because the nurse is relied upon to identify a new patient to the 
caseworker and samples taken from the patient and sent to a third-party lab are also controlled by the nurse. Cross-
checking of patient identity using a connection to the prison's identification system would reduce this risk. 
Moreover, obtaining the patient's prior medical history by connecting to external healthcare systems would further 
minimize this risk.  
It is also possible for the prisoner to become the victim of identity theft. Rather than the patient being examined 
by a physician onsite with the physician using a single EMR system, the patient’s identity is now revealed remotely 
to at least three people outside of the prison system, namely, the physician, the caseworker, and the pharmacist. 
Other personnel within earshot of a session or inappropriately in attendance of a session could also obtain the 
patient’s identity. Additionally, a medical record for the patient is maintained in two EMR systems, increasing the 
risk of unauthorized access. Though these are but simple examples of threats, our threat table demonstrates the 
utility of modeling both technical and social born threats to patient privacy. A partial threat table demonstrating 
these threats is shown in table 1. 
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Table 1. Partial Threat Table Example 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Analyzing information security threats in telemedicine applications requires analysis at a system level and software 
application level. The telemedicine system analyzed for this project mostly consisted of disparate software 
applications and other components. From our literature review we believe this to be generally the case in practice. 
As such, the need for information security and privacy analysis during the design, development, and operational 
phases of telemedicine applications is all the more salient given the very nature of information vulnerability in 
telemedicine. 
Previous studies of telemedicine information security have generally discussed vulnerabilities in terms of risk. 
Several studies simply list threats and categorized them in a risk matrix by likelihood and consequence. Though 
useful for risk analysis purposes, this approach does not provide an understanding of the types of threats and 
potential countermeasures for specific threats to a given vulnerability. In contrast, our method of using threat tables 
is focused on the threat, not the risk.  That is, if a goal in the design of a system or application is to minimize, or 
eliminate, a specific type of vulnerability then it is an understanding of all forms of attack on that vulnerability that 
is of interest. Simply knowing the level of risk of a given vulnerability does not provide as rich an understanding as 
knowledge of all forms of attack on the vulnerability. It is an understanding of threats at this level that is the 
contribution of our approach. 
Using our threat modeling approach gives practitioners an intuitive and simple method of listing vulnerabilities, 
threats to these vulnerabilities, and potential remedies to these threats. This is particularly useful to those developing 
or analyzing applications with high concern for security and privacy, like telemedicine. Threat tables are useful as-is 
or as a component of some system development methodology or risk analysis method. Here, we developed an 
example of a threat table using functional and task dimensions to illustrate identification of threats. Use of data flow 
diagrams or other system modeling methods could provide useful identification of vulnerabilities and potential entry 
points for an attack. Compared to using formal-based methods that can require specialized knowledge and software, 
our method is intuitive and easily implemented.   
The CoM staff was very concerned about security, although they did not describe any breaches that may have 
occurred.  CoM had not adopted a protocol or identified a process for threat modeling. Our simple protocol of using 
a threat table identified all of the potential problems that had been identified by CoM staff, and more. 
Notably, the physician in charge of the CoM system explained how the identity of the patient could pose a 
challenge and remarked that he therefore took steps to confirm the identity. This concern is readily deduced using 
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the threat table, as demonstrated above. Another prominent concern was the potential disclosure of information 
because conversation and video are transported over the Internet. This common threat is dealt with readily by the 
threat table. Indeed, the set of potential threats mentioned by CoM was easily exceeded using a short demonstration 
of the threat table. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We performed a high level analysis of information security threats to a telemedicine application. Using a framework 
that utilizes threat tables developed by the authors, we demonstrated a method of defining vulnerabilities and 
proposing countermeasures. Our analysis of the CoM telemedicine application reveals that even a telemedicine 
application in a physically static and electronically controlled environment is vulnerable to some of the same threats 
as seen in mobile environments utilizing public communication channels, demonstrating the usefulness of threat 
modeling to telemedicine applications. 
Because of its simplicity, the threat table approach appears to be a salient option for providers of telemedicine. 
The fact that telemedicine can involve a composite of systems and applications does not detract from the value that 
this method brings to modeling threats. Ensuring the security of telemedicine is not only necessary for legal and 
financial reasons but also for providing the peace of mind required for productive relationships between patients and 
medical professionals. 
Notably, our table-based approach to modeling threats and responsive actions is intentionally open-ended; it is 
capable of accommodating the analysis of any type of potential threat. This flexibility is necessary when constraints 
such as governmental regulations come into play. In particular, security in systems that handle medical information 
is regulated by HIPAA and the HITECH Act. In 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services published a 
final rule on security measures that must be incorporated within such systems. These requirements address such 
fundamental security measures as user authentication, encryption, and transaction logging, among others. Threats 
that potentially are remediated by such measures, or, more importantly, that impact their implementation, may 
readily be modeled using our approach. Therefore, table-based threat modeling that relies on STRIDE is consistent 
with both the spirit and text of HHS regulations. 
Our investigation into modeling the threats in this project was limited by our knowledge and understanding of 
the telecare systems analyzed. CoM was kind enough to demonstrate their system to us and discuss the details at an 
introductory level, but we did not have the opportunity to conduct an exhaustive audit of all elements of this system. 
Nonetheless, we gained enough knowledge during our visit to synthesize an initial, high-level threat model. Due to 
the limitations of the interview, little information was obtained about how the CoM staff views standardized 
approaches to threat modeling, but it appeared that the addition of a formalized protocol, such as our threat table 
approach, would potentially benefit their organization. 
With this initial understanding we will continue exploring the identification of security threats and how the traits 
of these threats and their countermeasures should be represented in a threat table. Our next step is to analyze a 
multifarious telemedicine system and consider refinement to the structure of the threat table. Our goal is to develop a 
practical and useful method of addressing security threats in the design and analysis of telemedicine systems with 
applicability to information systems in general. 
Future work could include studying threat tables in practice, as well as studying other threat modeling 
approaches, particularly formal methods, compared against this method for usability, effectiveness, and feasibility. 
Further, we could explore the utility of incorporating the threat table approach into an overall risk analysis of a 
telemedicine system. Finally, we would like to expand our threat analysis of telemedicine applications into 
unconventional environments, such as disaster relief environments, where telemedicine applications might be used 
with ad-hoc or hastily formed networks.  
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